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JUSTICE FRANK MURPHY AND
AMERICAN LABOR LAW
Theodore J. St. Antoine*
INTRODUCTION
Working people and disfavored groups were central concerns of
Frank Murphy, the last Michigan Law School graduate to sit on the
United States Supreme Court. In the pages of this Review, just over a
half century ago, Archibald Cox wrote of him: "It was natural ... that
his judicial work should be most significant in these two fields [labor
law and civil rights] and especially in the areas where they coalesce."'
In this Essay, after a brief overview of Murphy the man, his days at the
University of Michigan, and his career prior to the Court appointment,
I shall review some of the major labor and employment decisions
analyzed by Professor Cox and assess their continuing impact on
American law.
I. THE MAN, THE UNIVERSITY YEARS, AND THE POLITICAL
CAREER
Frank Murphy was a study in contrasts. He was born in 1890 and
grew up in a small town in the rural "thumb" area of Michigan, en-
joying a fun-filled, Tom Sawyer-like boyhood.2 Harbor Beach was al-
ways "home," the one place where he could return to find peace.' Yet
from an early age Murphy aspired to the social cachet of the best met-
ropolitan clubs, and he became a masterly big-city politician, one of
the great, if not the greatest, of Detroit mayors.' He was known as a
ladies' man, attracted by, and attractive to, a bevy of rich socialites,
but he never married. True to one Irish-Catholic stereotype, as biog-
rapher Sidney Fine put it, Murphy's pious and loving but demanding
* James E. & Sarah A. Degan Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Michigan Law
School. A.B., Fordham; J.D., University of Michigan. - Ed. I am much indebted to Sidney
Fine, whose monumental three-volume biography of the Justice has provided nearly all my
background information on Murphy. See infra notes 2, 18, 25.
I. Archibald Cox, The Influence of Mr. Justice Murphy on Labor Law, 48 MICH. L.
REV. 767, 767 (1950).
2. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE DETROIT YEARS 2-5, 14 (1975).
3. Id. at 17, 36.
4. Id. at 36, 358-59, 455-56.
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mother remained the "darling" of his life.5 And, probably in reaction
to his father's alcoholism, Murphy never drank. Lastly, for all his mid-
dle-class upbringing and ambition to rise in the world, Murphy as a
youngster learned political activism on behalf of the oppressed from
his lawyer father (primarily, to be sure, the oppressed in Ireland), as
well as racial and religious tolerance from his mother.6
Murphy was an indifferent student at the University of Michigan,
which he entered in 1908. Nonetheless, he described his life in Ann
Arbor as "simply one grand thing after another."7 He declined an invi-
tation from a college fraternity that denied membership to a Jewish
friend but wound up as head of the Sigma Chi chapter. He was a
leader in a wide variety of extracurricular activities, became renowned
as a campus orator, and was elected to several college honorary socie-
ties. For a sociology course, Murphy wrote a paper on "Politics and
the Laborer," reflecting his progressive views and presaging his future
advocacy of workers' causes. All students with less than stellar aca-
demic records, however, should take heart from his performance in
the Law Department. In his senior year, Murphy had two B's, eight
C's, a D, and an E (failure). He managed to receive his law degree on
time in 1914 only because the faculty, the day before graduation,
granted his petition for two additional credit hours (with a D grade),
retroactively, in a first-year property course! A demonstrative man,
Murphy later wrote his mother about the University, "I love and wor-
ship the place."9
Following graduation, Murphy spent three highly successful years
as a trial lawyer in a substantial Detroit firm. On the side, he taught
night school in a poor immigrant neighborhood, an experience that
was one of the "shaping influences" of his life. 10 In 1917, Murphy be-
came an Army officer, thanks to an intensive ROTC program. He ar-
rived at the French front the day Armistice was declared, apparently
upset that "Fate" had "called off the war" and prevented him from
leading troops in combat."1 Murphy returned to Detroit to become
First Assistant U.S. Attorney in 1919.12 Thus began a career in public
service that, with little interruption, would last a lifetime.
5. Id. at 6-14, 17, 84-89.
6. Id. at 10-12. Murphy did not attend Catholic schools (there were none in Harbor
Beach), and it was only after he became mayor of Detroit that he found support for his views
on the welfare state in the social encyclicals of the Popes. Id. at 254-55.
7. Id. at 18; see also id. at 19-28.
8. Id. at 26.
9. Id. at 27.
10. Id. at 34.
11. Id. at 48.
12. Id. at 58.
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In 1923, Murphy became the youngest person ever elected to the
bench in Detroit's Recorder's (Criminal) Court.13 He emerged as a
hero for the city's African Americans when he presided over the fa-
mous Sweet trials, in which Clarence Darrow, helped by Murphy's
evidentiary rulings and jury instructions, secured the acquittal of a
black householder who had fired on a white mob outside his home. 4
A combination of blacks and white ethnics elected Murphy as mayor
of Detroit in 1929.5 Detroit was one of the hardest hit economically of
American cities during the Great Depression, but Murphy was cred-
ited with considerable success in confronting the intertwined problems
of welfare benefits and city finance. 6 He was overwhelmingly
reelected in 1931."7 Then President Roosevelt, mindful of the impor-
tance of the Catholic vote to the Democrats, stepped in and appointed
Murphy, first, as governor-general and, later, as high commissioner of
the Philippines. He served from 1933 to 1936, when the exigencies of
Michigan politics and Roosevelt's reelection hopes called for
Murphy's return to run for governor."8 He won in a close race, riding
Roosevelt's coattails rather than the other way around. 9
The governorship made Murphy a major national figure. The most
dramatic event was the great sit-down strike at General Motors
("GM") in 1936-37. Workers at several Flint plants, seeking to organ-
ize on behalf of the United Automobile Workers ("UAW"), occupied
the buildings and refused to leave. Murphy regarded the action as an
illegal trespass and he called out the National Guard to maintain or-
der. But the Governor was opposed to bloodshed and refused to use
the Guard or State Police to eject the strikers forcibly." Instead,
Murphy personally intervened as mediator between GM and the
UAW. He proved adept in the role, and the strike was eventually set-
tled, with GM recognizing the UAW as the bargaining representative
for its members.2' A close observer declared the result "the high point
in Frank Murphy's entire career," and Time talked about "Murphy for
President in 1940. "22
Despite the plaudits immediately accorded Murphy for his success
in handling the Flint situation, other sit-down strikes continued to
13. Id. at 117.
14. /d. at 167.
15. /i. at 220-21.
16. Id. at 387.
17. Id. at 439.
18. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE NEW DEAL YEARS 20,231 (1979).
19. Id. at 250-51.
20. Id. at 298-99, 303.
21, Id. at 319-22.
22. Id. at 323-25.
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plague Michigan, and the state remained predominantly Republican.
Murphy was defeated handily in his bid for reelection in 1938.23
Shortly thereafter President Roosevelt appointed him Attorney
General.4 Murphy took on his new duties with gusto. He played sig-
nificant roles in the appointment of several distinguished members of
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals; helped expand antitrust
enforcement, not only against corporations but also against profes-
sional organizations and labor unions; and relentlessly pursued tax
evaders, underworld kingpins, and entrenched political bosses of both
parties.25 His short tenure as Attorney General has been authorita-
tively described as "one of the most remarkable years of service in the
history of the Justice Department. 
'26
In November 1939, Roosevelt told Murphy he was the President's
choice to fill the Supreme Court vacancy left by the death of Pierce
Butler, another Catholic from the Midwest. Murphy resisted. He felt
he was being kicked upstairs, away from the active life he prized, and
he still harbored visions of the presidency. Moreover, this was also one
of the few times this notoriously ambitious man seemed genuinely
humble. He regarded the Supreme Court as "beyond his grasp" and
"fear[ed] that my work will be mediocre up there. ' 27 When the formal
announcement of Murphy's nomination was made in January, how-
ever, there was "almost universal praise. '2s Murphy's admirers real-
ized he was no legal scholar but believed his familiarity with govern-
ment, political savvy, and big heart more than offset any deficiency.
II. MURPHY AS SUPREME COURT JUSTICE
Because of illness,29 Murphy did not take his judicial oath of office
until early February 1940 and did not fully enter upon his duties at the
Court until the end of the month.3" By then the Court was in the mid-
dle of its annual term, and Murphy accepted as his first law clerk a
23. Id. at 508-11.
24. Id. at 528.
25. SIDNEY FINE, FRANK MURPHY: THE WASHINGTON YEARS 32-34, 54-56 (1984)
[hereinafter FINE (1984)].
26. Id. at 141-42.
27. Id. at 133.
28. Id. at 137.
29. The flu or bronchitis may have been partly psychosomatic. My senior partner during
my active practice in Washington, D.C., was J. Albert Woll, who headed the Commercial
Frauds Section at Justice during Murphy's year there. Woll visited Murphy in his bachelor's
apartment in the Washington Hotel at the time of the Supreme Court nomination and was
convinced that Murphy was exaggerating if not feigning his ailments, hoping against hope he
could stave off the dreaded move to the "Marble Palace." Conversations with J. Albert
Woll, Senior Partner, Woll, Mayer & St. Antoine (circa 1960).
30. FINE (1984), supra note 25, at 142-43.
June 20021 1903
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young man who had clerked for a year on the Second Circuit and was
recommended by Felix Frankfurter. Subsequently, Murphy concluded
that this person was a Frankfurter "plant" within his chambers, and
thereafter he chose no one as clerks except high-ranking graduates of
the Michigan Law School. Even there, he tried to narrow his selection
to a known group. His first three Michigan clerks all came from the
class of 1940: John J. Adams, John H. Pickering, and Eugene
Gressman. Adams served one year, Pickering two years, and
Gressman five years, all one at a time in sequence. Murphy had two
clerks during his last year, 1948-49, John R. Dykema, class of 1947,
and Thomas L. Tolan, class of 1948.31
There seems no doubt that Murphy made the final decisions in
cases before the Court, both on petitions for certiorari and on the
merits. But he relied heavily on his clerks for summarizing petitions
and drafting opinions, and he was even prepared to listen to their ad-
vice on how to vote, especially on certiorari petitions.32 The Justice
was concerned with style as well as substance. John Pickering related
that after Murphy satisfied himself about the technical aspects of a
draft, he might gently admonish a clerk in a case that had particular
appeal to him, "It needs a little poetry!"33 Murphy was well aware of
the power of a resounding, quotable phrase to enhance the persua-
siveness of a decision. He also stressed that he wanted opinions that
were short, simple, and readable, so that they could be "understand-
able to every American.
3 4
During his short nine years as a Justice, Murphy expressed himself,
in concurrences and dissents as well as in opinions for the Court, in a
number of significant decisions dealing with civil liberties, civil rights,
and labor and employment law generally. I now turn to some of the
most memorable and influential of those cases.
III. PICKETING AS FREE SPEECH: THORNHILL
New Justices are traditionally allowed to select their initial writing
assignment, and Murphy could not have asked for anything more fit-
ting than Thornhill v. Alabama.35 Symbolic of Murphy's emphasis on
the human element in the law, his very first words for the Court put
the spotlight on the full name of the petitioner, Byron Thornhill, who
had been convicted of the crime of picketing a business by carrying
signs urging others not to deal with it. Thornhill was an employee of
31. Id. at 161-63.
32. Id. at 161-62.
33. Conversation with John H. Pickering, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Oct. 13, 2001).
34. FINE (1984), supra note 25, at 162-63.
35. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
1904 [Vol. 100:1900
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the Brown Wood Preserving Company and president of a local union
to which all but four of the Company's approximately one hundred
workers belonged. The union had gone on strike for reasons not stated
in the record. Thornhill was arrested "in company with six or eight
other men ... on the picket line," but there was no evidence of any
violence or intimidation of persons seeking to work.36 Thornhill was
charged in almost the exact language of an Alabama statute making it
a misdemeanor to "loiter" or "picket[]" for the purpose of "inducing
other persons not to... have business dealings with, or be employed
by" the picketed firm.37
In his 1950 article in this Review, Professor Cox commented:
The situation must have stirred Mr. Justice Murphy's deepest emotions: a
worker in a company town convicted of crime for peacefully seeking to
improve his lot; the offense, expressing his grievance and asking sympa-
thetic action by the only available means.... Liberty of expression was
also involved. Mr. Justice Murphy valued liberty of expression as a basic
political ideal indispensable to representative government. The depth of
his concern may also be attributable to his natural rights philosophy and
devout religious beliefs.3"
Up to this time even peaceful picketing had been regarded primar-
ily as an economic weapon, subject to regulation or prohibition by the
states.39 Nevertheless, Justice Murphy set about boldly to reverse
Thornhill's conviction. He immediately invoked the First
Amendment's protection of freedom of speech, a "fundamental per-
sonal right[]" secured by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridg-
ment by a state.4° He then declared that the Alabama statute had to be
tested on its face, because Thornhill had been charged and found
guilty in the general terms of the statute, which "purport[ed] to license
the dissemination of ideas. '4' The Alabama courts had authoritatively
interpreted the statute as prohibiting a single individual from patrol-
ling peacefully in front of an employer's establishment carrying a sign
36. Id. at 94-95.
37. Id. at 91-92 (quoting ALA. CODE § 3448 (1923)).
38. Cox, supra note 1, at 777.
39. E.g., Vegelahn v. Guntner, 44 N.E. 1077 (Mass. 1896); LUDWIG TELLER, LABOR
DISPUTES AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING § 111 (1940); cf. Am. Steel Foundries v. Tri-City
Cent. Trades Council, 257 U.S. 184 (1921). Under the common law tort theories of the time,
labor activities like strikes and picketing could be enjoined if they had "unlawful objectives"
or employed "unlawful means," very broadly defined. See, e.g., United Shoe Mach. Corp. v.
Fitzgerald, 130 N.E. 86, 87 (Mass. 1921); RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 775 (1939). But cf. Senn
v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 478 (1937) ("Members of a union might...
make known the facts of a labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal
Constitution.") (dictum). The introduction of anti-injunction statutes, like the Norris-
LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70 (1932) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 101-115 (1994)), and similar state
laws, affected the availability of equitable remedies, but that is not our concern.
40. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 95.
41. Id. at 96-97.
1905June 2002]
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stating truthfully that the business did not employ union labor.4" The
statute admitted of no exceptions and was thus invalid on its face: "In
the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information con-
cerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within that
area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution."43 In
obvious reference to the "clear and present danger" test for limiting
expression, Justice Murphy added: "Abridgment of the liberty of such
discussion can be justified only where the clear danger of substantive
evils arises under circumstances affording no opportunity to test the
merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in the market of public
opinion."44
In spite of the sweeping language of Thornhill, and its apparent
equating of picketing with free speech, its holding was actually a nar-
row one. Alabama would have outlawed all picketing per se. That it
could not do. But having planted the flag of the First Amendment
atop the mountain of peaceful picketing, Justice Murphy did little to
indicate how far down the slope on the farther side the domain of free
speech extended. Drawing the appropriate boundary line was left for
future decisions.
During Murphy's tenure on the Court, several decisions extended
First Amendment protections to "stranger" or nonemployee picket-
ing, even in situations where no "labor dispute" existed under state
law.45 But over the dissents of Murphy and three other Justices, a ma-
jority of the Court held a state court could enjoin picketing aimed at
exerting the "concerted pressure" of a group of employees to force a
caf6 owner to cease using a nonunion contractor in a construction
project that was unrelated to the restaurant. 6 Murphy did not dissent,
however, from a six-to-three decision sustaining a state court injunc-
tion against picketing that was peaceful in itself and yet "enmeshed
with contemporaneously violent conduct."47
42. Id. at 98-99 (citing O'Rourke v. Birmingham, 168 So. 206 (Ala. Ct. App. 1936), cert.
denied, 168 So. 209 (Ala. 1936)).
43. Id. at 102. In Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106, 113 (1940), decided the same day as
Thornhill, Justice Murphy elaborated: "[P]ublicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful
way through appropriate means, whether by pamphlet, by word of mouth or by banner, must
now be regarded as within that liberty of communication which is secured to every person by
the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State."
44. Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 104-05; cf Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
45. Cafeteria Employees Union, Local 302 v. Angelos, 320 U.S. 293, 294-96 (1943);
Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 772-75 (1942); AFL v. Swing, 312
U.S. 321, 325-26 (1941).
46. Carpenters & Joiners Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Caf6, 315 U.S. 722, 726-27 (1942)
(emphasis added).
47. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
292 (1941).
1906 [Vol. 100:1900
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Perhaps the Court's definitive statement during Murphy's years on
the bench regarding the constitutionally allowable limitations on pick-
eting was its unanimous decision in Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice
Co.48 The Court upheld a state court's enjoining of peaceful picketing
whose "sole, unlawful immediate objective" was to induce wholesale
distributors to agree with a union not to sell ice to nonunion ped-
dlers.49 This effort violated a state statute prohibiting combinations in
restraint of trade." Because the validity of the state antitrust legisla-
tion was accepted, it was easy to conclude that "placards used as an es-
sential and inseparable part of a grave offense against an important
public law cannot immunize that unlawful conduct from state con-
trol.,""
Similarly, Osama bin Laden's oral instructions to his al-Qaeda
network may be speech in the most conventional sense. They are still
not immune from the regulatory power of government if they are in
furtherance of a terrorist conspiracy. 2 With Giboney as the touch-
stone, the critical factor would be the end pursued rather than the ex-
pressive means employed. If the end is unlawful, picketing or any
other form of expression in direct furtherance of it can be restricted. If
the objective - for example, the decision of an individual customer to
refrain from purchasing a nonunion product - is lawful and cannot
constitutionally be declared unlawful, then under this view peaceful
picketing, like any other form of expression in furtherance of it, can-
not be forbidden under the Constitution. The question is whether the
Thornhill/Giboney analysis of Justice Murphy's era has survived - or
should have survived - to the present day.
Since I have explored this issue at length elsewhere,53 I shall be
briefer here. There are at least four main overlapping objections to the
concept of picketing as a form of free expression. They may all be
covered by the notion that picketing is speech "plus" rather than pure
48. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
49. Id. at 502.
50. Id. at 495.
51. Id. at 502.
52. See, e.g., Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273, 277 (1915) (upholding statute condemn-
ing speech that encourages violations of law).
53. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Free Speech or Economic Weapon? The Persisting Problem
of Picketing, 16 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 883 (1982). My approach was anticipated by Francis E.
Jones, Jr., Free Speech: Pickets on the Grass, Alas! - Amidst Confusion, a Constant Princi-
ple, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 137, 157 (1956) ("Picketing, like any other speech, is protected by the
Constitution - as a means; however, like other speech, it will not be protected when used
for the purpose of accomplishing an unlawful end."). For a vigorous exposition of the con-
trary point of view, see CHARLES 0. GREGORY & HAROLD A. KATZ, LABOR AND THE
LAW 289-329 (3d ed. 1979). See generally E. Merrick Dodd, Picketing and Free Speech: A
Dissent, 56 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1943); Edgar A. Jones, Jr., Picketing and Coercion: A Reply,
39 VA. L. REV. 1063 (1953).
1907June 2002]
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speech. Justice Douglas summed it up: "Picketing by an organized
group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particular
locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce action
of one kind of another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas
which are being disseminated."54 Picketing or patrolling with signs is of
course a physical activity and subject to trespass laws55 and to a
content-neutral regulation of the time, place, and manner. 6 The same
would be true of a parade or other popular demonstration. Violent
picketing or picketing "in a context of violence" may also be prohib-
ited." But that is no more than a particular application of the tort law
of assaults.
More to the point is the contention that picketing induces action
without regard to the ideas being communicated. If so, it is either be-
cause of physical fear or an instinctive reflex on the viewer's part, or
because the picketing constitutes a "signal" for the viewer to engage in
certain prearranged behavior. Truly coercive picketing has been dis-
cussed and need not detain us further. But if the viewer's reaction is a
genuinely voluntary, though relatively unthinking, reflex, how can the
picketing that triggers the reaction be distinguished from the cryptic
bumper stickers "Vote Free Choice" or "Vote Right to Life"?" More
convincingly, Professor Cox has contended:
54. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring). But cf. Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v.
Louisiana, 1965 SuP. Cr. REV. 1, 23 ("[A]II speech is necessarily 'speech plus.' ").
55. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. San Diego County Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978).
56. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (barring sound trucks); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941) (regulating parades).
57. Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287,
293 (1941).
58. Cox, supra note 1, at 786 ("Nor can we seek to judge between appeals to reason and
bare slogans arousing prejudice or emotion."). Picketing in certain situations might create a
clear and present danger that a substantive evil would occur, while an oral or written com-
munication delivered far from the scene or phrased in abstract terms might not. But that is a
function of the immediacy and concreteness of the message rather than something inherent
in the mode of communication. Speech other than picketing has been similarly analyzed. See
also NLRB v. Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 341 U.S. 675, 678-79 (1951) (holding
that a labor council's notice to its affiliated unions of a decision to picket a job site was "a
signal in the nature of an order to the members of the affiliated unions to leave the job");
Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911) (examining the status of an
unfair list used to "signal" a boycott by unionized employees acting in concert); cf. Branden-
burg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that advocacy cannot be forbid-
den except when it is an "incitement to imminent lawless action"); Yates v. United States,
354 U.S. 298 (1957) (holding that statute prohibiting advocacy of overthrow of government
was limited to advocacy of specific acts and did not cover advocacy of overthrow as abstract
doctrine); Archibald Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. REV. 574, 601
(1951) ("[T]he Court cannot long distinguish between the picket line and the unfair
list .... ).
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[T]he constitutional decisions in picketing cases should depend, in part,
on whether the "publicity" or "signal" aspect predominates.... The
critical inquiry is whether the employees' conduct involves an appeal to
an uncoerced audience each individual in which is left free to choose his
own course of conduct or invokes the power of an organized combina-
tion.59
The Cox publicity-signal distinction is a good, practical characteri-
zation of the Giboney6 unlawful-objective formulation in actual op-
eration, although it fails to provide as satisfying a theoretical rationale
as does the Court itself. Publicizing a labor dispute and appealing for
the support of an individual member of the consuming public is seek-
ing a lawful end. Signaling to an organized group of employees to
bring concerted pressure to bear to force a neutral person to take sides
may be aiming at an unlawful "secondary boycott.'' 6 At any rate, for
forty years after Thornhill, whenever the Supreme Court dealt with
peaceful picketing seeking the performance of a lawful act by the im-
mediate or ultimate target of the picketing, uncoerced by organized
employees or a group acting in concert, it consistently sustained the
constitutional right of the picketers, in Thornhill's words, "to advise
customers and prospective customers... and thereby to induce such
customers not to patronize" the target businesses.62 That included one
case in which the Court majority engaged in some rather strained
statutory interpretation to avoid a constitutional question. In NLRB v.
Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits),63
the Court held that picketing addressed to customers only, asking
them not to purchase one specific nonunion item at a supermarket
carrying the usual multiplicity of other products, was not an illegal
secondary boycott under the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). Thornhill continued to ride high during the Warren Court
years, and it remained a significant influence thereafter, even in cases
59. Cox, supra note 58, at 595, 602; see also Cox, supra note 1, at 787-93.
60. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
61. Section 8(b)(4)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act forbids so-called secondary
boycotts, whereby a union forces a neutral or secondary party not to deal with the union's
primary target in a labor dispute. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(B) (1994); see, e.g., Denver Bldg., 341
U.S. at 677-78 (picketing against general contractor to force him to dismiss nonunion sub-
contractor). See generally Howard Lesnick, The Gravamen of the Secondary Boycott, 62
COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1962). For historical background, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Labor
Conspiracies in American Law, 1880-1930, 66 TEXAS L. REV. 919 (1988). Another unlawful
end would be getting an employer to force his employees to join a union. See, e.g., Int'l Bhd.
of Teamsters, Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284,285-86 (1957).
62. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 99 (1940); see also cases cited supra note 45.
63. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). Justice Black, concurring, believed Congress intended to pro-
scribe secondary consumer picketing like that in Tree Fruits, but he would have found the
statute so construed unconstitutional. Id. at 76. (Black, J., concurring); cf. Police Dep't of the
City of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (invalidating ordinance on basis of Equal Pro-
tection Clause - although the First Amendment was "intertwined" - because it forbade
picketing next to a school but exempted peaceful picketing during a labor dispute there).
1909June 20021
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outside the labor field.6'
The Thornhill/Giboney doctrine65 suffered a major setback in 1980.
In NLRB v. Retail Clerks Local 1001 (Safeco),66 the Supreme Court
held, 6-3, that picketing asking consumers not to buy a nonunion
product being distributed by a second party could be forbidden as an
unlawful boycott under the NLRA where the distributor derived
ninety percent of its income from the sale of the picketed product. The
constitutional question received short shrift, a single paragraph, in a
four-member opinion by Justice Powell.67 Nowhere is there the slight-
est indication that the Supreme Court precedents' relied on were dis-
tinguishable in that they dealt with appeals for concerted employee ac-
tion or action by unionized workers presumably subject to group
loyalties and discipline. Nowhere is it recognized that Safeco was the
first time the Court had ever clearly upheld a ban on peaceful picket-
ing addressed to, and calling for seemingly lawful responses by, indi-
vidual consumers acting on their own.
Justices Blackmun and Stevens, concurring in part, did not join in
Justice Powell's "cursory discussion" of the free speech issue, thus
leaving the Court without a majority opinion on the constitutional
question.69 Unfortunately, their own efforts leave much to be desired.
Justice Blackmun reasoned limply: "I am reluctant to hold unconstitu-
tional Congress's striking of the delicate balance between union free-
dom of expression and the ability of neutral employers, employees,
and consumers to remain free from coerced participation in industrial
strife." ° Where was the evidence that consumers were coerced, either
in this case or generally?
Justice Stevens has more interesting things to say, but I also find
inadequate his distinction between picketing and handbilling: "[T]he
principal reason why handbills containing the same message are so
much less effective than labor picketing is that the former depend en-
tirely on the persuasive force of the idea. "71 Cannot the handbiller con-
front the approaching customer with the same pair of beady eyes as
the picketer? Or is it the sign on the stick that bothered Justice
64. See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 909 (1982) (picketing in
support of black boycott of white merchants to promote desegregation).
65. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
66. 447 U.S. 607 (1980).
67. Id. at 616.
68. E.g., IBEW Local 501 v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 705 (1951), cited in Safeco, 447 U.S. at
616.
69. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 616-17 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 618 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring).
70. Id. at 617-18.
71. Id. at 619 (emphasis added).
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Stevens? Unless we expect the stick to be wielded as a weapon, it
would surely seem improper to forbid the picket sign but not the
handbill merely because the placard may be more visible and thus
more likely to catch a busy shopper's eye.72 And what if the placards
were not carried on sticks but, as has been done, were draped over the
shoulders of elderly men and women? Finally, suppose the pickets
were not union organizers at all, but an African-American civil rights
group peacefully urging moviegoers not to attend The Birth of a Na-
tion?
The three dissenters in Safeco - Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall - did not even attempt to grapple with the First Amend-
ment issue. They contented themselves with the statutory question,
concluding that the NLRA did not forbid peaceful consumer picketing
aimed solely at a nonunion product rather than the neutral distribu-
tor's business as such, regardless of the percentage of the neutral's
sales represented by that product.73
Professor Cox, while recognizing the deficiencies of the Safeco
opinions, still believes the decision "can be fitted into the body of first
amendment [sic] law if picketing is classified with commercial adver-
tising as economic speech."74 There is certainly logic in that position,
especially if it were a question of first impression. But although Justice
Murphy is nothing like the legal craftsman of a Cox or of some of the
Justices who have wrestled with the problem of picketing over the
years, one has little doubt where Murphy would stand on relegating
picketing to the category of commercial advertising. Said he in
Thornhill's companion decision, Carlson v. California,75 "[tihe carrying
of signs and banners, no less than the raising of a flag, is a natural and
appropriate means of conveying information on matters of public con-
cern." One can hear in those lines the ring of "a little poetry.76
Ironically, an even more conservative Court than the one that had
decided Safeco, and sharply limited the constitutional status of pick-
eting, later handed labor unions a major organizing weapon by main-
taining the distinction between picketing and handbilling, and by sus-
72. Cf. Bakery & Pastry Drivers & Helpers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 775 (1942)
(Douglas, J., concurring) (querying whether a state "can prohibit picketing when it is effec-
tive but may not prohibit it when it is ineffective").
73. Safeco, 447 U.S. at 622-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74. ARCHIBALD Cox, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 47 (1980); cf. Edward J. DeBartolo
Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 576 (1988) ("We
do not suggest that communications by labor unions are never of the commercial speech va-
riety and thereby entitled to a lesser degree of constitutional protection.").
75. 310 U.S. 106, 112-13 (1940). Even the more conservative and scholarly Justice
Frankfurter was ready to concede, "Peaceful picketing is the workingman's means of com-
munication." Milk Wagon Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S.
287,293 (1941).
76. See supra note 33.
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taining the right to handbill customers with much the same sort of
strained statutory construction used by the Warren Court to exempt a
limited form of consumer picketing in Tree Fruits.77 In Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Construction
Trades Council,78 a union had a dispute with a building contractor over
its allegedly substandard wages and fringe benefits. The contractor
was hired to construct a department store in a shopping mall. The un-
ion peacefully distributed handbills at the entrances of the mall, urging
customers not to patronize any of the shops in the mall until all con-
struction was done by contractors paying "fair wages and fringe bene-
fits." The handbills made clear, however, that the union was not
seeking a work stoppage by any store employees. The National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") ruled the consumer handbilling was "co-
ercion" of the secondary employers in violation of section 8(b)(4)(B)
of the NLRA.79
In an opinion by Justice White, six members of the Court observed
that the Board's construction of the statute would pose serious ques-
tions as to its validity under the First Amendment.8" Here there was no
picketing or patrolling. Picketing is "qualitatively different"; handbills
"depend entirely on the persuasive force of the idea."'" Justice White
declared: "The loss of customers because they read a handbill urging
them not to patronize a business, and not because they are intimidated
by a line of picketers, is the result of mere persuasion .. ."82 Justice
White went on to note for the Court that the NLRB's reading would
prohibit newspaper, radio, and television appeals to the same effect as
the handbills. Nothing in the language or legislative history of section
8(b)(4), the Court concluded, prevented interpreting it as not reaching
peaceful handbilling, and thus the constitutional questions were
avoided.83 DeBartolo has significantly expanded the publicity tactics
77. See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
78. 485 U.S. 568 (1988).
79. Id. at 570, 573 (quoting 273 N.L.R.B. 1431, 1432 (1985) (internal quotation omit-
ted)). The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit had denied enforcement. 796 F.2d 1328
(11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam).
80. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 575. There were no dissents. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
concurred in the judgment. Justice Kennedy did not participate. For Justice White the hand-
bills did not appear "typical commercial speech" advertising the price or merits of a product
since they "pressed the merits of unionism to the community" and "the dangers of inade-
quate wages to the economy." But even as commercial speech the handbills would present
"serious constitutional issues." Id. at 576.
81. Id. at 580 (quoting Babbitt v. Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 311 n.17 (1979) (quoting
Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950)) (internal quotation omitted); see also
NLRB v. Retail Store Employees Union, Local 1001, 447 U.S. 607, 619 (1980) (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (internal quotation omitted)).
82. DeBartolo, 485 U.S. at 580.
83. Id. at 588.
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available to labor organizations and has led to so-called corporate
campaigns against nonunion firms through widespread nonpicketing
appeals to suppliers and customers.' Frank Murphy, a doughty cham-
pion of free speech in all its forms, would have applauded this later
development even as he regretted Safeco's restrictions on peaceful
consumer picketing.
IV. EMPLOYER FREE SPEECH: VIRGINIA ELECTRIC
Virginia Electric & Power Co. had long been hostile to labor or-
ganizations.85 Its president had told the employees a union was "en-
tirely unnecessary." Later, by a posted bulletin and oral statements at
meetings, the Company urged employees to create an "inside" or
"[i]ndependent" organization, rather than join an AFL or CIO affili-
ate. Meanwhile, the Company kept meetings of a rival CIO union un-
der surveillance and warned workers they would be discharged for
"messing with" the CIO. An independent union was duly formed and
the Company negotiated a contract with it. Four workers were fired
for refusing to join the independent or for supporting another organi-
zation. The NLRB ruled that the Company had committed unfair la-
bor practices by coercing employees and discriminating against them
for union activity, and by "dominating" the inside union. What is most
significant for our purposes, however, is that the Board, as Justice
Murphy stated in his opinion for the Supreme Court, "specifically
found that the bulletin of April 26 and the speeches of May 24 'inter-
fered with, restrained and coerced' the Company's employees in the
exercise of their rights guaranteed by § 7 of the Act.
8 6
Justice Murphy would not have been troubled if the Board's order
had been based on the "totality of the Company's activities," so that
the Court would not have to consider the "coercive effect of the bulle-
tin and the speeches in isolation. 8 7 The problem was that the Board
had treated the "utterances" themselves as unfair labor practices and
had apparently not "raised them to the stature of coercion by reliance
on the surrounding circumstances."88 With only an oblique reference
to the First Amendment, cited as grounds for an employer argument
84. See, e.g., Brown & Root v. La. State AFL-CIO, 10 F.3d 316 (1994) (lobbying); cf.
Sequoia Constr., Inc. v. Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local Union No. 12, 136 L.R.R.M.
(BNA) 2021 (D. Nev. 1990) (leaflets and newspaper article). See generally Thomas C. Koh-
ler, Setting the Conditions for Self-Rule: Unions, Associations, Our First Amendment Dis-
course and the Problem of DeBartolo, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 149; James Gray Pope, Labor-
Community Coalitions and Boycotts: The Old Labor Law, the New Unionism, and the Living
Constitution, 69 TEXAS L. REV. 889 (1991).
85. NLRB v. Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469, 470-74 (1941).
86. Id. at 476-77 (quoting NLRB order).
87. Id. at 477.
88. Id. at 479.
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that the NLRB's finding of coercion on the basis of the bulletin and
speeches was "repugnant" to it, Justice Murphy declared: "Neither the
Act nor the Board's order here enjoins the employer from expressing
its view on labor policies or problems .... The employer in this case is
as free now as ever to take any side it may choose on this controversial
issue."' 9 The solution was a remand to the Board for a "redetermina-
tion of the issues in the light of this opinion."9°
Archibald Cox, in his half-century-old article in this Review, de-
scribed the dilemma confronting Murphy in Virginia Electric as fol-
lows: "The case must have given the Justice great difficulty. Few
judges have placed as high a value on liberty of expression. But he also
believed with equal sincerity that collective bargaining was essential in
modern industry, and ordinarily he voted to uphold an exercise of ad-
ministrative discretion."'" Professor Cox went on to suggest that Mur-
phy's conflicted allegiances may have led to the uncertainties in the
opinion that for a time masked its importance. There is no doubt,
however, about its ultimate influence.
Prior to Virginia Electric, as eminent a jurist as Learned Hand was
prepared to uphold the Board in striking down an employer's argu-
mentative communications to employees as inherently coercive:
"What to an outsider will be no more than the vigorous presentation
of a conviction, to an employee may be the manifestation of a deter-
mination which it is not safe to thwart."92 Thereafter, a whole series of
courts of appeals' decisions reversed NLRB findings of violations
based on statements of argument and opinion.93 In the subsequent
Taft-Hartley amendments to the NLRA, the essence of the Virginia
Electric rationale was written into section 8(c).94 Although section 8(c)
could be read literally to require the coercive nature of a message to
be determined on the face of the statement, several courts of appeals
have held in effect that the full position of Justice Murphy in Virginia
Electric should be implemented. In appraising a communication, the
"totality" of the employer's conduct must be considered and not
merely the "isolated words cut off from the relevant circumstances."95
89. Id. at 477.
90. Id. at 480.
91. Cox, supra note 1, at 784.
92. NLRB v. Federbush Co., 121 F.2d 954, 957 (2d Cir. 1941).
93. E.g., NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 157 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1946); NLRB v. Am.
Tube Bending Co., 134 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1943); Jacksonville Paper Co. v. NLRB, 137 F.2d
148 (5th Cir. 1943).
94. Codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(c) (1994): "The expressing of any views, argument, or
opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or visual form,
shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of
this Act, if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit."
95. E.g., J.P. Stevens & Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 292, 302-03 (2d Cir. 1967); Daniel
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 805, 811 (4th Cir. 1965); NLRB v. Kropp Forge Co., 178 F.2d
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Today the most vexing problem regarding employer speech is
probably distinguishing between allowable "predictions" and forbid-
den threats. In NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co.,96 the Supreme Court put
it this way:
[An employer] may even make a prediction as to the precise effects he
believes unionization will have on his company. In such a case, however,
the prediction must be carefully phrased on the basis of objective
fact .... If there is any implication that an employer may or may not
take action solely on his own initiative for reasons unrelated to economic
necessities and known only to him, the statement is no longer a reason-
able prediction based on available facts but a threat of retaliation.., and
as such without the protection of the First Amendment.
Drawing the line has not proven easy for the NLRB and the courts.
Courts of appeals have often reversed the Board's findings of viola-
tions when employers told employees that a union victory in a repre-
sentation election would result in the outsourcing of certain opera-
tions,97 a substantial reduction in business,98 or an imperiling of jobs
that were dependent on low costs. 99 In such cases the courts have pri-
marily focused on whether the employers' statements were factually
supportable.
One might speculate that Justice Murphy would have been more
concerned with direct evidence of coercion on the part of the employ-
ers, as demonstrated by the "totality of [their] activities."'" As a
champion of free speech, he was wary of looking at employer commu-
nications in isolation. As a practical man, he was likely aware that
making a prediction "carefully phrased on the basis of objective facts"
could be more attributable to good legal counsel than to innocent mo-
tivation. Thus, in analyzing a statement to employees on its face,
Murphy might have been willing to accord employers greater latitude
than did Gissel. Virginia Electric indicates his focus would have been
on the entire set of circumstances in which the utterance occurred, and
the "different coloration" that a statement takes on "by virtue of the
accompanying circumstances. 0 1
822, 828-29 (7th Cir. 1949). But cf. Surprenant Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 341 F.2d 756, 758-60 (6th
Cir. 1965); Wellington Mill Div., West Point Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 330 F.2d 579, 583 (4th Cir.
1964).
96. 395 U.S. 575, 618 (1969).
97. Kinney Drugs, Inc. v. NLRB, 74 F.3d 1419, 1429 (2d Cir. 1996).
98. DTR Indus. v. NLRB, 39 F. 3d 106 (6th Cir. 1994).
99. Crown Cork & Seal Co. v. NLRB, 36 F.3d 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
100. See supra text accompanying note 87.
101. See Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. NLRB, 365 F.2d 898, 909-10 (D.C. Cir.
1966).
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V. THE RIGHT TO ORGANIZE: THE PLANT GUARD CASES
Two cases that were hardly headliners in the annals of Supreme
Court jurisprudence are worth mentioning as demonstrations of
Justice Murphy's belief in the value of employee self-organization and
collective bargaining. During World War II, War Department
Regulations issued pursuant to a Presidential Executive Order re-
quired plant guards in defense industries to become civilian auxiliaries
of the military police of the Army. Private management retained con-
trol over hiring, compensation, dismissal, and other working condi-
tions, but the military could exercise veto power over hiring and firing.
Guards received some military training and were subject to military
service elsewhere. The regulations permitted collective bargaining, but
the guards would generally have to be in separate bargaining units
from the production and maintenance employees.' 2 In two cases
reaching the Supreme Court, the NLRB had certified unions as repre-
sentatives of such guards and ordered bargaining, but courts of ap-
peals had denied enforcement. In NLRB v. E.C. Atkins & Co.,1"3 the
reviewing court held the militarized guards were not "employees"
within the meaning of the NLRA. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,"°4 the court had held that the guards could not join the same
union that represented production and maintenance employees, even
though the guards were in a separate unit. In both instances the courts
also relied in substantial part on the notion that unionization of the
militarized guards was contrary to the national welfare."'
For a person like Frank Murphy, the two decisions must have writ-
ten themselves. Of course the guards were still employees'0 6 The
Labor Board was performing its delegated function of defining statu-
tory terms. It was entitled to recognize economic realities and was not
confined to traditional technical concepts. The company maintained
sufficient control over the guards to retain its status as employer.
Similarly, in the second case, the Board's policy of permitting the
guards to select a union that also represented production employees in
another unit was not unreasonable." It would limit the guards' free-
dom of choice to deny them representation by the only union that may
have had sufficient experience with the employer effectively to bar-
102. To preclude conflicts of interest, the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments added to §
9(b) of the NLRA a requirement that guards could not be represented by a union admitting
employees other than guards to membership. Act of June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tit. I (codified at
29 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1994)).
103. 155 F.2d 567 (7th Cir. 1946), vacated by 331 U.S. 398 (1947).
104. 146 F.2d 718 (6th Cir. 1944), vacated by 331 U.S. 416 (1947).
105. 331 U.S. 416, 420 (1947); see also Atkins, 331 U.S. at 401.
106. Atkins, 331 U.S. at 403-14.
107. Jones & Laughlin, 331 U.S. at 422-26.
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gain for them. There are no signs of misgivings as the opinion marches
briskly forward.
Justice Murphy also had little difficulty with what many persons,
including the dissenting Justices, must have found most troublesome
in these two situations, namely, the potential risk to national security
in having militarized guards at defense plants join a union. In a pas-
sage permeated with his faith in the virtues of both collective bar-
gaining and the American worker, he wrote:
[T]he collective bargaining process is flexible enough to allow for the in-
creased responsibilities placed upon the militarized guards. ... More-
over, the Board has discovered no serious question as to any conflict
between loyalties to the Army and to the union, the Board finding no ba-
sis to assume that membership in a union tends to undermine the patri-
otism of militarized guards or that loyalty to the United States would be
secondary in their minds to loyalty to the union.105
In reversing the courts below, Justice Murphy reiterated one of his
common themes. The judiciary does not possess all wisdom and should
often defer to the specialized expertise of administrative agencies or
executive departments:
Here we have the Board's considered and consistent judgment that
militarized plant guards may safely be permitted to join unions and bar-
gain collectively and that their military duties and obligations do not suf-
fer thereby. In agreement with that viewpoint has been the War
Department, the agency most directly concerned with the military as-
pects of the problem ....
Under such circumstances, it would be folly on our part to disregard
or to upset the policy the Board has applied in this case. 09
Congress and subsequent Supreme Courts decisions have not al-
ways shown such deference to the NLRB. Amendments to the NLRA
in 1947 restricted guards to unions composed exclusively of guards11
and expressly excluded "independent contractors" (like newspaper
delivery persons) and "supervisors" from the category of "employees"
covered by the Act."' And in several instances the Court has dis-
agreed with the Board, holding, for example, that the faculty members
of a "mature" university were managerial employees'12 and that regis-
tered nurses and certain licensed practical nurses were supervisory
personnel. 3 These groups were thereby excluded from the coverage
108. Id. at 423-24.
109. Atkins, 331 U.S. at 414-15.
110. See supra note 102.
111. NLRA § 2(3), 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (1994), overturning NLRB v. Hearst Publ'g, Inc.,
322 U.S. 111 (1944).
112. NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672 (1980) (5-4 decision).
113. NLRB v. Kentucky River Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706 (2001) (5-4 decision);
NLRB v. Health Care & Ret. Corp. of Am., 511 U.S. 571 (1994) (5-4 decision). See generally
1917June 2002]
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1917 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
of the Act. Justice Murphy would have strongly resisted these judicial
denials of the statute's protections through such inroads on the term
"employee."
VI. UNIONS' DUTY OF FAIR REPRESENTATION: STEELE
Justice Murphy's fondness for collective bargaining did not blind
him to its failings. One of the most indefensible took center stage in
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co."4 Section 2, Fourth of the
Railway Labor Act ("RLA")"5 made the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen, as the representative of a majority of the
firemen on the Louisville Railroad, the exclusive bargaining agent for
all the firemen, whether union members or not. Most of the firemen
were white and belonged to the Brotherhood. A substantial minority
were black and were excluded from membership under the union's
constitution. Without notice to the black firemen and without an op-
portunity for them to be heard, the Brotherhood and the railroad en-
tered into a collective-bargaining agreement that sharply restricted the
blacks' access to firemen's jobs and was apparently designed to ex-
clude them ultimately from such employment altogether.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court, declared that constitu-
tional questions would be presented if the Act conferred exclusive
bargaining power on the representative of a class of employees "with-
out any commensurate statutory duty" toward the members of that
class." 6 He concluded that Congress had no such intent. Instead, the
Court held that the RLA,
read in the light of the purposes of the Act, expresses the aim of Con-
gress to impose on the bargaining representative of a craft or class of
employees the duty to exercise fairly the power conferred upon it in be-
half of all those for whom it acts, without hostile discrimination against
them."7
More specifically, in negotiating contracts with a carrier, a union is re-
quired "to represent non-union or minority union members of the
craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith."'
That was not quite enough for Justice Murphy. He seethed:
David M. Rabban, Can American Labor Law Accommodate Collective Bargaining by Pro-
fessional Employees?, 99 YALE L.J. 689 (1990); David M. Rabban, Distinguishing Excluded
Managers from Covered Professionals under the NLRA, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1775 (1989).
114. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
115. 45 U.S.C. § 152, Fourth (1994).
116. Steele, 323 U.S. at 198.
117. Id. at 202-03.
118. Id. at 204.
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The utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of colored citi-
zens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the invocation
of constitutional condemnation. To decide the case and to analyze the
statute solely upon the basis of legal niceties, while remaining mute and
placid as to the obvious and oppressive deprivation of constitutional
guarantees, is to make the judicial function something less than it should
be1 19
Softening his stance somewhat, Murphy went on to acknowledge his
willingness to read the statute as forbidding any action by a bargaining
representative that would violate individuals' constitutional rights. He
was not sure, however, that this was the basis for the Court's construc-
tion of the statute. Murphy wanted no avoidance of the constitutional
question. Instead, he wanted it "squarely faced": "No statutory inter-
pretation can erase this ugly example of economic cruelty against col-
ored citizens of the United States.'
120
Both Justice Murphy, in his heated, almost evangelical style, and
Chief Justice Stone, in his cooler, more legalistic manner, displayed a
remarkable measure of legal imagination in their handling of the
Railway Labor Act in Steele. That the Congresses that passed the
original RLA in 1926121 and amended it in 1934122 had any notion they
were adopting some sort of Fair Employment Practices Act sub silen-
tio, a whole generation before the hard-fought battle over Title VII of
the 1964 Civil Rights Act,2 3 can only be described as a breathtaking
legal fiction. Yet as meticulous a craftsman as Archibald Cox saluted
the Stone opinion as "a classic example of the law's capacity for
growth through the shaping of its fundamental traditions to meet the
problems created by new institutions.' 1 24 Cox added that Justice
Murphy's "constitutional condemnation of 'this ugly example of eco-
nomic cruelty' restated the law's concern for democratic aspirations in
terms that common men would understand, and by doing so he helped
to keep their faith alive.
125
The union duty of fair representation that was developed under
the Railway Labor Act has now been extended to the National Labor
119. Id. at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring).
120. Id. at 208, 209.
121. 44 Stat. 577 (1926) (codified as amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1994)).
122. Railway Labor Act Amendments of 1934, ch. 691, 48 Stat. 1185 (codified as
amended at 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-152 (1994)).
123. 78 Stat. 241, 253 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1994)). For different
accounts of the legislative struggle, see Herbert Hill, Black Workers, Organized Labor, and
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: Legislative History and Litigation Record, in RACE IN
AMERICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY 263, 265-71 (Herbert Hill & James E. Jones, Jr.
eds., 1993); Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV.
431, 437-47 (1965).
124. Cox, supra note 1, at 773.
125. Id. at 774.
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Relations Act.126 A union breaches this duty, however, only when its
treatment of a member is "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith,"
or it acts in a "perfunctory fashion. ' 127 Mere negligence in represent-
ing a member's interests is not enough.128 In addition, somewhat belat-
edly and more questionably as a technical matter, the NLRB has de-
clared a union's unfair representation to be an unfair labor practice.
129
My hunch is Justice Murphy would have been reasonably comfortable
with all these developments. He would not have expected impeccable
judgment from modestly educated union business agents making close
calls under severe time pressures. At the same time, he would not
have worried unduly about technical impediments to such a practical
step as the Labor Board's assuming jurisdiction over breaches of the
duty of fair representation as unfair labor practices.
Sixteen years after its Steele decision on racial discrimination, the
Supreme Court faced another case in which the Railway Labor Act
had to be interpreted so as to avoid constitutional questions. Section 2,
Eleventh of the Act 3 ° authorizes carriers and unions to enter into
union-shop agreements, whereby employees must become union
members (or pay the equivalent of regular union dues) as a condition
of employment. Moreover, the RLA's provision, unlike a similar sec-
tion in the NLRA, overrides any state law to the contrary. The Court
had previously held that this was sufficient "governmental action" to
raise issues under the First Amendment and the Due Process Clause,
even though the union-shop agreements were entered into by private
parties. 1 ' The question presented in International Ass'n of Machinists
v. Street,3 2 however, was whether it was a violation of the First
Amendment for a union to use dues money collected under the com-
pulsion of the union-shop agreement for political purposes to which an
employee objects.
126. Syres v. Oil Workers Int'l Union, Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (mem.); see also
Ford Motor Co. v. Huffman, 345 U.S. 330, 338 (1953) ("wide range of reasonableness must
be allowed a statutory bargaining representative"). See generally THE CHANGING LAW OF
FAIR REPRESENTATION (Jean T. McKelvey ed., 1985).
127. Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 190,191 (1967).
128. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372-73 (1990).
129. Local 12, United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum & Plastic Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12
(5th Cir. 1966); Metal Workers Local 1 (Hughes Tool Co.), 147 N.LR.B. 1573 (1964);
Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181 (1962), enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172 (2d Cir. 1963).
Board dissenters argued that the listing of employee rights in § 7 of the original NLRA of
1935 was unchanged by the 1947 amendments. Section 7 could not have contained an im-
plied fair-representation duty binding on labor organizations, therefore, since only employ-
ers (who by themselves have no such duty) were subject in 1935 to the Act's unfair labor
practice provisions.
130. 45 U.S.C. § 152 (1994).
131. Ry. Employes' [sic] Dep't v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225, 232 (1956) (holding RLA § 2,
Eleventh not unconstitutional on its face).
132. 367 U.S. 740 (1961).
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Justice Brennan played the role in Street that Chief Justice Stone
had played in Steele. Through a tortuous reading of the legislative his-
tory, he concluded for the Court that "[o]ne looks in vain for any sug-
gestion that Congress also meant in § 2, Eleventh to provide that un-
ions with a means for forcing employees, over their objection, to
support political causes which they oppose." '133 The statute itself for-
bade such expenditures, and the constitutional question could be
skirted. Blunt old Justice Black, taking a part analogous to Murphy's
in the earlier case, would have none of this: "The end result of what
the Court is doing is to distort this statute so as to deprive unions of
rights I think Congress tried to give them .. "134 But in Black's eyes,
Section 2, Eleventh, properly interpreted, violated the free speech
guarantees of the First Amendment. Justice Frankfurter, joined by
Justice Harlan, would have interpreted the statute as did Justice Black
but would have upheld its validity.135
Justice Murphy would have been torn by Street. He would likely
have agreed with Justices Black and Frankfurter on the meaning of
Section 2, Eleventh and he would have seen through the right-to-work
rhetoric of the corporate lawyers promoting the challenge to the stat-
ute.136 He would also have recognized, like Justice Frankfurter, that
striking down unions' political expenditures "would greatly embarrass
if not frustrate conventional labor activities which have become insti-
tutionalized through time." '137 But Justice Murphy's ultimate alle-
giance, as in Virginia Electric,3 was to freedom of expression, and he
probably would not have been offended by the final resolution in
Street and its progeny. A union may not "collect from dissenting em-
ployees any sums for the support of ideological causes not germane to
its duties as collective-bargaining agent." '39 Except in right-to-work
states forbidding union shops, however, unions may still prevent "free
riders" by securing agreements entitling them to obtain from all em-
ployees their pro rata share of the organization's costs in negotiating
and administering the labor contract and related activities. In the ab-
sence of an employee's objection, dues money may also be used for
political or ideological purposes.14°
133. Id. at 764.
134. Id. at 785 (Black, J., dissenting).
135. Id. at 799-801 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
136. It is only fair to mention that I drafted the amicus brief for the AFL-CIO in Street.
137. Street, 367 U.S. at 818 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
138. See supra text accompanying notes 85-91.
139. Ellis v. Bhd. of Ry., Airline & S.S. Clerks, 466 U.S. 435, 447 (1984); see also Com-
munications Workers v. Beck, 487 U.S. 735 (1988) (employees subject to NLRA); Abood v.
Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209 (1977) (public sector employees).
140. See generally Roger C. Hartley, Constitutional Values and the Adjudication of Taft-
Hartley Act Dues Objector Cases, 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1 (1989). Other federal and state stat-
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VII. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS: THE "PORTAL-TO-PORTAL" CASES
In Tennessee Coal, Iron & Railroad Co. v. Muscoda Local 123
("TCI"),14' the question was whether the Fair Labor Standards Act
("FLSA"),1 as it then read, included as "hours" of the "workweek"
the time iron ore miners spent traveling underground from the mine
entrance to the "working face" where they drilled and extracted ore. If
so, the mines owed substantial sums to their employees. The travel
time had been excluded in calculating the forty-hour workweek, after
which the employers were required to pay time-and-a-half overtime.
Justice Murphy was in his element while writing the opinion for
the Supreme Court. "Such an issue," he declared, "can be resolved
only by discarding formalities and adopting a realistic attitude, recog-
nizing that we are dealing with human beings and with a statute that is
intended to secure to them the fruits of their toil and exertion." '43 At
this point the mineowners presumably knew they were in trouble. It
got worse. Justice Murphy went on to describe riding underground in
the so-called skips, or ore boxcars:
[S]ince the skips usually clear the low mine ceilings by only a few inches,
the miners are compelled to bend over .... with bodies contorted and
heads drawn below the level of the skip top. Broken ribs, injured arms
and legs, and bloody heads often result; even fatalities are not unknown.
The length of the rides in the dark, moist, malodorous shafts varies in
the different mines from 3,000 feet to 12,000 feet. The miners then climb
out... and continue their journeys on foot for distances up to two
miles .... The air is increasingly warm and humid, the ventilation poor.
Odors of human sewage.., permeate the atmosphere .... Water, muck
and stray pieces of ore often make the footing uncertain .... At all times
the miners are subject to the hazards of falling rocks.
1 44
Not surprisingly, Justice Murphy concluded that the underground
travel time thus spent by the miners, done for the benefit and under
the supervision of the employers, was includable in the "workweek"
for the purposes of determining entitlement to overtime. The FLSA
applied "portal to portal." Justices Frankfurter and Jackson concurred
in separate opinions, emphasizing that two lower courts had found
that the miners' travel possessed the characteristics of "work" as
utes expressly limit a union's political contributions and expenditures. See generally Robert
M. Cohan, Comment, Of Politics, Pipefitters, and Section 610: Union Political Contributions
in Modern Context, 51 TEXAS L. REV. 936 (1973).
141. 321 U.S. 590 (1944).
142. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, ch. 676, § 7(a), 52 Stat. 1060, 1063, § 7(a) (codi-
fied at 29 U.S.C. § 207(a) (1994)).
143. TCI, 321 U.S. at 592.
144. Id. at 596.
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commonly understood.'45 Justice Roberts, joined by Chief Justice
Vinson, dissented on the grounds it had long been the custom and
practice in the related coal-mining industry to pay only for work at the
mine face, and the FLSA should be interpreted in light of that history.
Justice Murphy, speaking this time for a bare majority of the
Court, extended the TCI decision to the bituminous-coal-mining in-
dustry in Jewel Ridge Coal Corp. v. Local 6167, United Mine
Workers.'46 The major factual difference was that in coal mining there
was a universal fifty-year custom and usage, confirmed by "every col-
lective bargaining agreement which was ever made," not to treat un-
derground travel time as work time.'47 Justice Murphy brushed this
aside: "The Fair Labor Standards Act was not designed to codify or
perpetuate those customs or contracts which allow an employer to
claim all of an employee's time while compensating him only for a part
of it."'
148
Justice Jackson now dissented, supported by Chief Justice Vinson
and Justices Roberts and Frankfurter. In a long recital of the historical
background, Jackson stressed that the Mine Workers and the coal
mine operators, in presentations to the Wage and Hour Administra-
tion, had all opposed construing the FLSA to require payment for
travel time. That was the price for securing higher wage levels through
collective bargaining. For Justice Jackson, the majority's decision
would "impair for all organized labor the credit of collective bargain-
ing, the only means left by which there could be a reliable settlement
of marginal questions concerning hours of work or compensation."' 49
With Justice Murphy once more leading the way, the Supreme
Court took a final, ill-fated step in Anderson v. Mt. Clemens Pottery
Co." The Company employed about 1200 employees at its pottery
plant, with around ninety-five percent of them compensated on the
basis of piece work. As calculated by the employer, the workers' eight-
hour day did not include the time spent walking from the time clock to
their workbenches or preparing themselves or the machinery there.
Total walking time during a day was estimated at two to twelve min-
utes or more daily, and preparation time another three or four min-
utes. On behalf of the majority, Justice Murphy stated that the time
spent walking and engaging in preliminary activities would have to be
counted as compensable under the Act. The activities were performed
solely on the employer's premises and involved "physical or mental
145. Id. at 604 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); id. at 605 (Jackson, J., concurring).
146. 325 U.S. 161 (1945).
147. Id. at 166 (quoting 53 F. Supp. 935, 950 (D. Va. 1944) (internal quotation omitted)).
148. Id. at 167 (quoting TCI, 321 U.S. at 602 (internal quotation omitted)).
149. Id. at 195.
150. 328 U.S. 680 (1946).
June 2002] 1923
HeinOnline  -- 100 Mich. L. Rev. 1923 2001-2002
Michigan Law Review
exertion (whether burdensome or not) controlled or required by the
employer and pursued necessarily and primarily for the benefit of the
employer and his business." '151 The time for this thus "differed vitally
from the time spent in traveling from workers' homes to the fac-
tory. 152 Justices Frankfurter and Burton dissented. Justice Jackson did
not participate.
Unlike TCI and Jewell Ridge, Mt. Clemens Pottery could poten-
tially apply to any large industrial operation. And it differed so much
in degree as to amount to a difference in kind. Riding or walking sub-
stantial distances through "dark, moist, malodorous" - and hazard-
ous - underground shafts is one thing, and walking a short way
through a modern factory is quite another. Archibald Cox had little if
any difficulty classifying the former as "work," regardless of custom or
contract, but the latter was more problematic.'53 The statute's policy
against overlong hours did not help. For Professor Cox, the choice
came down to "the judge's conception of his proper role in our soci-
ety." '154 Should judges leave major reforms to elective bodies or under-
take, under the guise of statutory construction, those reforms seen as
desirable, so long as no apparent legislative intent is ignored?
The judicial activism of Justice Murphy, in Cox's view, was
grounded in two factors:
He thought in terms of fair play, decent standards of living, oppression,
justice and injustice .... He believed also ... that the authority of a
Supreme Court Justice carried weight beyond the litigants; therefore he
should speak out against persecution or oppression even though affir-
mance or reversal of the judgment did not so require.'
5
Cox felt, however, that the portal-to-portal cases showed the short-
comings of this judicial philosophy. Case-by-case adjudication, he said,
is based on too narrow a record for broad generalizations, and the
principles developed in one setting may be applied too mechanically in
later, quite diverse settings. 156 But surely those are not inherent defi-
ciencies in an activist philosophy, whatever else may be its failings. A
careful judge should be well aware that the very strength of case-by-
case adjudication is attention to particular circumstances and that any
change in relevant circumstances may call for a change in the govern-
ing principle. Rightly or wrongly, Justices Frankfurter and Jackson
had no trouble distinguishing among TCI, Jewell Ridge, and Mt.
Clemens.
151. Id. at 691-92 (quoting TCI, 321 U.S. at 598 (internal quotation omitted)).
152. Mt. Clemens, 328 U.S. at 691.
153. Cox, supra note 1, at 807-08.
154. Id. at 808.
155. Id. at 809.
156. Id.
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Nevertheless, Professor Cox was undoubtedly correct that the ac-
tivist judge runs the risk of misgauging public sentiment and creating a
backlash against the very causes he or she seeks to advance. 157 Mt.
Clemens Pottery would have exposed American industry to potentially
heavy liabilities, and Congress swiftly responded with the Portal-to-
Portal Act of 1947.158 In effect, the Act overturned the Supreme Court
decisions on travel and preparation time, except insofar as their results
were supported by custom, practice, or contract. But in fact the
collective-bargaining agreements of miners thereafter did proceed to
provide compensation for their underground travel time.159 Justice
Murphy may have lost some battles, but his stirring words were
heeded, and he won a major war.
CONCLUSION
Frank Murphy was not a great scholar or legal craftsman. Yet he
brought to the law and the art of judging some eminently worthy val-
ues. Among them was an unceasing determination to see realized in
the daily lives of ordinary people such basic human rights as freedom
of expression, fair and equal treatment, personal dignity, and the ca-
pacity to form organizations to promote their political, economic, and
social well-being. In pursuing these objectives Murphy had a keen un-
derstanding of the practical role of government at all levels. For ex-
ample, he sensed early on and heartily approved of the extraordinary
impact the new federal and state administrative agencies of the 1930s
would have on the life of the nation. As biographer Sidney Fine ob-
serves: "He was a New Dealer before there was a New Deal, an advo-
cate of the welfare state before there was a welfare state, and a pio-
neer in the transformation of the federal system that occurred during
the Roosevelt era."'16
For all his commitment to workers' causes, however, and his firm
belief in the merits of unionization and collective bargaining, Murphy
could rise above such loyalties at the dictate of an overarching princi-
ple like free speech. Virginia Electric6' is the proof. For a sophisti-
cated and skeptical age, which tends to depreciate a Frank Murphy
157. Id. at 810.
158. 61 Stat. 84, 29 U.S.C. §§ 251, 254 (1994). Section 4 of the Act provides that, in the
absence of custom, practice, or contract to the contrary, the FLSA's minimum wage and
overtime requirements do not apply to an employee's time spent in (1) "walking, riding, or
traveling to and from the actual place of performance of the principal activity or activities"
and (2) "activities which are preliminary to or postliminary to said principal activity or activi-
ties." 29 U.S.C. § 254(a).
159. Cox, supra note 1, at 810.
160. FINE (1984), supra note 25, at 595.
161. See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
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with his simple faith and technical limitations, there may be a lesson
here. The ultimate test of judicial character is the willingness to place
principle1 62 ahead of partisan causes. Justice Murphy met that test.
162. For Justice Murphy, of course, it might have to be a living, breathing, vital principle
- free speech, nondiscrimination, or something of equally practical meaning - and not an
arid, abstract "formality" of legal doctrine. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. As
Attorney General, also, Murphy gained a reputation for placing principle before political or
other factional interests. See supra text accompanying note 25.
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